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George -

In case you  
missed -

Bob  
Thanks I didn't  
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October 8, 1975

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE

H 9813

they will not wear any American military uniforms. They will wear ordinary clothes, and I am sure they will not be considered veterans of the military services of the United States after they return to this country.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. Yes, I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. WOLFF. Is it not true that this resolution passed in the committee unanimously, 31 to 0?

Mr. MORGAN. That is correct.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. Yes, I yield to the gentleman from Colorado.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Would the gentleman elucidate a little bit more as to who these 200 volunteers are and where they will come from? Obviously they are supposed to have some sort of technical competence.

We have no idea of who these civilian, so-called volunteers are supposed to be.

Mr. MORGAN. The thrust of this resolution is that they should not be military or CIA people. They should, of course, have the necessary technical knowledge of an early-warning system.

Wherever they come from, whether they come from among the people who produce the early-warning system, they will have to have some technical knowledge, but they will be strictly volunteers.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Will the equipment be Egyptian equipment, Israeli equipment, manufactured in the United States, or elsewhere?

Mr. MORGAN. I am sure that the equipment that will be involved in an early-warning system of this kind will be U.S. equipment.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. It is U.S. equipment.

Will the equipment be operated solely by these Americans or do the Egyptians and Israelis have the capability of operating the equipment themselves?

Mr. MORGAN. As I said in the first part of my statement, the Americans will be monitoring the operation of the early-warning system.

One group of American technicians will operate three tactical warning stations in the area of the passes. They will report to all parties, including the U.N. peacekeeping force. However, the Egyptians and the Israelis will operate their own strategic early-warning system stations.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. It still is not clear to me as to whether we are providing additional capability. In other words, are we providing something that the parties cannot provide themselves by putting 200 technicians in the Sinai?

Mr. MORGAN. In equipment, yes.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. The gentleman is not answering my question. Are we providing something that the parties cannot provide for themselves? In other words, are the Israelis and the Egyptians incapable of operating the early-warning equipment or monitoring the equipment our technicians will be operating?

Mr. MORGAN. The gentleman knows

very well that the parties to the Arab-Israeli dispute do not have the most complete trust in each other. Also, some of their technicians may not be as well trained in the use of certain sophisticated equipment as some American technicians. On both grounds, and for both reasons, the presence of American technicians is considered necessary to insure the integrity of the early-warning system.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MORGAN) has expired.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 additional minutes.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. FASCELL. Is it not true with respect to the question raised by the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. JOHNSON), that the evidence before our committee indicated that while technical competence was necessary to serve, and operate, the early warning stations an esoteric competence is not required. The technical needs can be met by what can be called standard technical competence.

As a matter of fact, we made it very clear in the testimony before the committee that the committee did not want as part of the volunteers, active military, CIA or other similar personnel nor those who were in military or intelligence service and have recently retired. We have ample talent available to do the job, and ones that could be trusted by both sides.

Mr. MORGAN. The gentleman is correct that we neither need nor want U.S. military technicians, or CIA technicians, for this job.

Mr. SKUBITZ. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas.

Mr. SKUBITZ. Mr. Chairman, do I understand the gentleman in the well to say that the 200 technicians would be protected by 5,000 members of the U.N. forces?

Mr. MORGAN. I think these people will be well-protected. Since both sides want them there, they will undoubtedly have the protection of the Egyptian Army and of the Israeli Army plus the U.N. force. I am sure that both countries having requested the technicians, both will see to it that they are pretty well protected.

Mr. SKUBITZ. Do I understand the gentleman to say there will be 5,000 members of the United Nations forces in the area?

Mr. MORGAN. That is right, there are about 5,000 in there now.

Mr. SKUBITZ. Of the 5,000, how many would be American troops?

Mr. MORGAN. There are no American troops in the U.N. peacekeeping force.

Mr. SKUBITZ. Will any be required to go into the United Nations forces?

Mr. MORGAN. Pardon?

Mr. SKUBITZ. Will any American troops be required to go into the United Nations forces? Of those 5,000 United Nations forces located there, will any American troops be located there?

Mr. MORGAN. No.

Mr. SKUBITZ. Who will pick up the tab for the 5,000 U.N. troops there?

Mr. MORGAN. Of course that is done through the United Nations.

Mr. SKUBITZ. What share will we have to stand?

Mr. MORGAN. Our share is about 28.8 percent under a formula worked out with the U.N. Security Council.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has again expired.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 additional minutes.

Mr. Chairman, in response to the gentleman from Kansas, let me add that we pay our regular U.N. share of about 25 percent, plus a small additional percentage shared by all permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.

Mr. SKUBITZ. 25 percent?

Mr. MORGAN. Yes.

Mr. SKUBITZ. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, an important, hard-won peace settlement in the Middle East hangs on the action of the House today.

The only responsible course for the Congress is to approve the proposal, as requested by the President, but with the added safeguards provided by this resolution.

If we disapprove this resolution, the Egyptian-Israeli agreement likely will be null and void.

Such a development would greatly increase the chances of new fighting in the Middle East within a relatively short period of time—with all the dangers involved.

Further, there is a need to act quickly.

According to the timetable worked out by the two parties, steps toward putting the accord into effect were to begin last Monday, October 5.

There is some evidence that Israel, as a gesture of goodwill, has permitted the first steps to be taken despite the lack of congressional action. How far and how long Israel will continue this practice is not clear.

If the timetable is upset and must be renegotiated, there is a possibility that the entire agreement could be in trouble.

The answer for the Congress seems clear: We must act favorably and we must act now.

I, therefore, urge that the House approve House Joint Resolution 683.

Mr. BELL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. BELL. Mr. Chairman, in response to the inquiry of the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. JOHNSON) is it not true that perhaps Israel and the Egyptians may have that sophistication, however the real point and the reason where the bat meets the ball is basically the fact that the United States prestige is the important factor, is that right?

Mr. MORGAN. I think the gentleman is correct. I think the United States has done everything we could to help them work out their problems, but they still want the U.S. presence there.

Mr. SKUBITZ. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield further to the gentleman from Kansas.

Mr. SKUBITZ. In the report it says there are presently about 40 Americans in the armed forces in the area now. Will they be removed?

Mr. MORGAN. There are about 56 U.S. military officers who are attached to the United Nations Observer Force in that area. There are no Americans in the area that are connected with our Government as combat forces. They are Americans but they are part of a United Nations contingent which is supervising the Israel-Egypt ceasefire in the Sinai. There are a number of U.N. people in there.

Mr. SKUBITZ. I understand there are a number of U.N. people there and in the overall group there are about 39 who are Americans according to the report. Are we going to withdraw them?

My question is, is the gentleman going to withdraw them?

Mr. MORGAN. No, not to my knowledge.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. WOLFF. The U.S. Armed Forces that are with the U.N. are not in the buffer zone that we are speaking about now.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 additional minutes.

Mr. MOFFETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman from Connecticut.

Mr. MOFFETT. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

The Chairman indicated that if, in fact, we did not approve this, that it is likely that the agreement would be void. I think that is probably right. Without making any judgments at all on the value of this agreement, I wonder if the distinguished Chairman could tell this Member and others how he feels about the fact that a Secretary of State puts something in the lap of a Congress not only on this issue but on many issues, and the Congress can only be the culprit. In other words, we have very little, if anything, to do with it, and then suddenly it is in our lap. It seems to me that this has happened before. I wonder if it is the chairman's view that this is going to happen again and again with the present Secretary of State, and if it is a good or a bad thing.

Mr. MORGAN. On the issue we are debating here, I think the leadership was consulted after the Secretary came back from the Middle East. I want to advise the gentleman that when the negotiations were going on, the Department of State was in touch with the leadership, with the chairman and the ranking minority member of the Committee on International Relations, the chairman and the ranking minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the chairman and ranking minority members of other appropriate committees.

I am talking about mid-August when the negotiations were going on. So Con-

gress was consulted to some extent. I am under the impression that Dr. Kissinger did not want to agree to the presence of American technicians on Sinai, but he finally did agree so that agreement to promote the cause of peace would be possible.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. BROOMFIELD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of House Joint Resolution 683 and the proposal to station volunteer American civilian observers near the Sinai passes. The Sinai disengagement agreement of September 1 is an important diplomatic achievement. I accept the assertion that it is the most significant breakthrough in Arab-Israeli relations in a generation. But let us be frank to admit that the agreement does not resolve, or pretend to resolve, any of the major outstanding issues in the festering Middle East dispute. This accord, in the final analysis, will be judged by what it engenders. It has the potential to unlock other doors and help unravel the complex, emotional issues at the heart of the Arab-Israeli dilemma. It is an important step toward peace, but it must be followed by other, equally important steps in other, equally important areas.

One thing is clear. The potential inherent in the Sinai agreement cannot be tested or realized until Congress sanctions an American observer presence in the Sinai. Approval of House Joint Resolution 683 is a precondition to the implementation of this agreement. The agreement, in turn, is a precondition to further movement toward peace in the Middle East. There is a direct, explicit link between our action today and the future of our peacemaking efforts in the area.

I am sure all of us in this Chamber would prefer an agreement that does not require American observers in the Sinai passes. We must realize, however, that without the American presence demanded by both Israel and Egypt there will be no agreement. The risks involved in sending Americans to man the early warning stations are tolerable. The risks inherent in the failure of this agreement—a failure that could occur by our unwillingness to approve the legislation before us—are not tolerable. They are the risks of renewed warfare, economic turmoil, confrontation, and the related human suffering.

Like many Members of the House, I have reservations about the open-ended commitment of American civilians in a potential combat zone. I was initially sympathetic to the concept of limiting this authorization to 2 years renewable by Congress. But, when informed by the State Department that such a time limit would entail renegotiating certain aspects of the agreement and delaying its implementation, I concluded that it would be wrong to write in such a limitation.

Mr. Chairman, there should be no ambiguity over what we are being asked to approve today. House Joint Resolu-

tion 683 deals exclusively with congressional authorization to send up to 2,000 American civilian volunteers to the Sinai, thereby enabling the agreement negotiated last month to take effect. The language of the resolution states explicitly that we are not underwriting any other agreement, understanding, or commitment proffered by the executive branch.

The Sinai disengagement agreement is not a perfect pact, but it is the best obtainable and it deserves our support. Thirty years ago President Roosevelt suggested that—

Perfectionism, no less than isolationism or imperialism or big power politics, may obstruct the paths of international peace.

We cannot today seize upon imperfection as a pretense for obstruction. The stakes—the possibility of peace in the Middle East—are far too high. This is a good agreement, it is a sound agreement serving our national interests. It maintains the momentum toward peace and understanding in a vital area of the world and merits our support.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say I agree with the gentleman's position about the limitation. It has taken us longer than 2 years to get this agreement and I just do not think we ought to tinker with it by putting a limitation on it. If we can put the people in there and it works, that will be the single greatest step we will have taken for peace in that region in my lifetime. I do not know about the probability of its working in 2 years.

Mr. BELL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. BELL. Mr. Chairman, we hear so much about the United States prestige and the Soviet Union prestige. This becomes important in the world when we are dealing with a world body. Would the gentleman not say that Egypt heretofore has been considered favorable to the Soviet Union, but the prestige of the Soviet Union has been sinking in the Mediterranean and as a result of this the Egyptians have turned to the United States and have asked us to help, and Israel has done the same. Does that not give one the impression that the prestige of the United States has substantially improved as a result of this situation?

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I would agree with the gentleman. Of course the fact that the situation has changed somewhat in that region of the world has enabled President Sadat and his government to take this step. It is a significant move and a move toward peace.

Mr. BELL. It seems to me it would also affect other areas of the world by virtue of the fact that our leadership has increased and we have been able to help the other areas of the world because of that.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I would agree with the gentleman.

It has been said that the Sinai agreement is not a perfect pact and I agree.

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# ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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Legislative Counsel

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8 October 1975

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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

Director

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We have scheduled a briefing of the Hamilton Investigation Subcommittee for Tuesday, 21 October on Middle East affairs. [ ] and two others will do the briefing. There will be no transcript and Hamilton has been very good in stressing the need to prevent leaks as a condition to assure continuation of such briefings.

Although no letter from you is necessary, we do think it is a good idea to further applaud Hamilton's efforts in keeping these matters secret within the Subcommittee.

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*J* George L. Cary  
Legislative Counsel